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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA1'E OF UTAH
vVALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah bank & trust
company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WESLY S. BURRO\i\TS, a/k/a
\VESLEY S. BURROWS, et al.,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No.
12873

and
ESTELLA McARTHUR,

Intervenor.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action to determine, among other
things, the validity and priority of rights in cattle as between defendant-respondents Gale C. Bailey, McKay
G. Bailey, LaFaye Bailey, Gloria Bailey, Terrill W.
Bailey and Colleen Bailey, (hereinafter called the
"Baileys") who had sold said cattle under a conditional
1

sales contract, aud plaintiff-appellant, 'V alker Bank,
which had loaned money to the conditional buyer of said
cattle on the s.ecurity of said cattle and thereby provided
funds which were paid to the Baileys on the conditional
sales contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, sitting without a jury. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the Baileys and against Walker
Bank adjudging that the Baileys had the right to rescind
the conditional sales contract and repossess the cattle
and that Walker Bank had no interest in the cattle or
the proceeds thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Walker Bank, seeks to have the judgment of the trial court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Walker Bank
and against the Baileys for the value of the cattle repossessed by the Baileys plus the money received by the
Baileys from the sales of the calf crops from said cattle.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts in this case are those set forth in
the Statement of Facts in appellant's brief. The facts set
forth in appellant's brief are not merely the appellant's
2

version of the facts based upon carefully selected portions of evidence abstracted from the transcript. They
are the facts found by the trial court as set forth in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case.
In contrast, many of the "facts" as set forth in respondent's Statement of Facts at pages 2-6 of their
brief are not facts at all. They were not found as facts by
the trial court or included in Findings of Fact entered
by the trial court. They are not supported by the record
on appeal.
The following are the portions of respondent's
"Statement of Facts" with which appellant disagrees
and which appellant asserts were not found as facts by
the trial court: (a) the statement at the top of page 5 of
respondents brief that the conditional sales contract identified the brands described and the land where the cattle
were to be kept and complied with the Uniform Commercial Code; ( b) the allegations contained in the last
two paragraphs of page 5 of respondent's brief concerning alleged conversations between appellant and respondent; ( c) the allegation in the first paragraph of
page 6 of respondent's brief concerning the statements
of Wesley Burrows.
ARGUMENT
It is Walker Bank's position that this case is identical to the recent Utah Supreme Court case of Wilson v.
Burrows, ______ U2d ______ , 497 P2d 240 ( 1972) which held
that the interest of 'V alker Bank had priority over the
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interest of conditional sellers of cattle. The Baileys, in
their brief, have raised three points which they contend
distinguish this case from the case of 'Vilson v. Burrows.
Since Walker Bank did not discuss these three points in
its appellant's brief, it will discuss them here in the order
that they were raised by the Baileys.
POINT I
WESLEY BURROWS LA\VFULLY OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE CATTLE FROM
THE BAILEYS AND THEREFORE HAD
THE POWER TO .MORTGAGE THE CATTLE
TO WALKER BANK.
In Point I of their brief the Baileys contend that
Wesley Burrows did not lawfully obtain possession of
the cattle from the Baileys. They contend that since
Burrows did not lawfully obtain possession that Burrows could not mortgage the cattle to Walker Bank and,
under Section 70A-9-113 UCA, 1953, as amended, the
Baileys were not required to file a financing statement
with the Secretary of State in order to perfect their claim
against the cattle. They assert that this is a material distinction from the facts presented in the Wilson v. Burrows case.
The fore going allegations of the Baileys are refuted in every respect by the Findings of Fact of the
trial court in this case. Finding of Fact No. 6 states:
"6. The 311 cows and 12 bulls referred to in
Exhibit 'P-30' were delivered by the Baileys to
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Burrows on or about June 30, 1966, and were
placed on 50 Mile Mountain. From that time
until some time in 1968, when the Baileys repossessed the ranch and cattle, the cattle were in
the possession of \V esly Burrows, although during that period the Baileys were requested to and
did take care of these cattle from time to time."
(R. 32)
In addition to delivering physical possession of the
cattle to Burrows, the Baileys executed a document in
which they certified that they had delivered possession
to him. Finding of Fact No. 5 states in part:
"5. On or about June 30, 1966, Gail Bailey
executed Exhibit 'P-30' which stated: 'This is to
certify that I delivered to '7\T esley S. Burrows 311
cows and 12 bulls." (R. 31)
It is impossible to see how the Baileys can assert
that Burrows did not lawfully obtain possession of the
cattle in the face of these clear and unequivocal fin dings
of the trial court. Since Burrows did lawfully obtain
possession of the cattle, the Baileys were required under
Section 70A-9-113 to file a financing statement with the
Secretary of State in order to perfect a lien against the
cattle. As stated in the Official Comment to UCC 9-113:

"A secured party who wishes to retain a security interest after the debtor lawfully obtains
possession must comply fully with all the provisions of this Article and ordinarily must file a
financing statement to perfect his interest." 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, p. 501.
This, the Baileys failed to do.

5

The facts concerning how Burrows obtained possession of the cattle are identical in every respect in this
action and in the case of vVilson v. Burrows. Here the
Baileys delivered physical possession of the cattle to
Burrows, just as the Wilsous had delivered physical possession of the cattle to Burrows in the Wilson v. Burrows case. Here the Baileys certified in writing that they
had delivered possession of the cattle to Burrows, just
as the Wilsons had certified in the vVilson v. Burrows
case. Here, the written certification of the Baileys concerning the cattle was delivered to Walker Bank, whereupon Walker Bank disbursed $25,000 of the loan proceeds. In the Wilson v. Burrows case the written certification of the W ilsons was delivered to Walker Bank,
whereupon Walker Bank disbured $30,000 of the loan
proceeds. See Finding of Fact No. 5. (R. 31-32)
The respondents do not attack the trial court's
Findings of Fact and do not allege that Findings No. 5
and 6 are unsupported by the evidence. These Findings
conclusively establish that Burrows lawfully obtained
possession of the cattle. These Findings also establish
that the facts concerning delivery and possession of the
cattle in the instant case are identical in all respects to
the facts involved in the Wilson v. Burrows case.
POINT II
THE FINANCING STA 'l'EMENTS FILED BY
WALKER HANK COMPLIED 'VITH THE
UTAH UNIFORM COl\:IMERCIAL CODE AND
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GAVE \VALKER BANK A
AGAINST THE CATTLE.

FIRST LIEN

The respondents contend in Point II of their brief
that the financing statements which were filed by Walker Bank were defective in inadequately describing the
cattle on which Walker Bank claimed a lien.
Walker Bank filed two financing statements covering the cattle on which it claims a lien. Both of these
statements were filed with the Secretary of State months
before the Baileys filed their security agreement. See
Findings of Fact 2, 9 and 10 (R. 30, 33). The first financing statement which was filed listed as security
"700 head of Hereford cattle, together with the increase
thereof branded with the scissors brand and located on
50 Mile J.Vlountain in Garfield, Kane and \V ashington
Counties." See Finding of Fact No. 2 (R. 30). As
stated by respondents, the second financing statement
which was filed by Walker Bank was identical except
that it also listed the pitchfork brand.
It is difficult to imagine how financing statements
covering cattle could be more explicit. They list the
number of head, the brands on the cattle, the breed of
cattle and the range on which the cattle are located.
\V alker Bank went much further than the law requires
in describing the cattle on which it claims a lien. Section
70A-9-110 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, states:
"70A-9-l 10. Sufficiency of description.-For
the purposes of this chapter any description of
personal property or, except as otherwise re-
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quired by subsection ( 1) of section 70A-9-402
relating to the contents of a financing statement,
real estate, is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."
The two financing statements of Walker Bank
which are involved in this case are the identical f inancing statements which were involved in the case of Wilson
v. Burrows. This Court held in the JVilson v. Burrows
case that these financing statements gave Walker Bank
a first lien on the cattle.
The respondents also seem to be alleging that the
first financing statement which was filed by Walker
Bank could not create a lien in favor of the Bank because
it was filed before the Baileys delivered the cattle to
Burrows. This contention completely ignores the provisions of 70A-9-303 and 70A-9-204, UCA, 1953 as
amended. These two provisions provide, in effect, that
where a lender files a financing statement before a borrower receives possession of the collateral, the lender's
lien is automatically perfected as soon as the borrower
receives possession of the collateral. See: In The Matter
of United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714 (N.J.
1965); In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich.,
1969).
The financing statements of Walker Bank, both of
which were filed with the Secretaary of State long before any filing by the Baileys, more than adequately described the cattle in question. They are, in fact, the very
same financing statements which gave 'Valker Bank a
first lien in the case of Wilson v. Burrows. The lien

8

created by the first financing statement, which was filed
on June 21, 196G, ( R. 30) attached on about June 30,
Hlti6, when the Baileys delivered the cattle to Burrows.
The second financing statement became effective on
February 8, 1967, the date it was filed, since Burrows,
011 that date, ah·eady had possession of the cattle ( R. 33) .
POINT III
llO'l'H FINANCING
OF \1VALKER BANK WERE FILED PRIOR
'l'O THE '1'11\IE ANY FINANCING
i\lEi\1'1' WAS FILED .BY THE BAILEYS, AND
SlNC:g THE BAILEYS KNEW THAT WALKER BANK
A LIEN AGAINST THE
CATTLE PRIOR TO THE TI:J\ilE THEY FILED THEIR FINANCING STATEMENT, THE
LIEN OF WALKER BANK HAS PRIORITY.
In Point III of their brief the respondents allege
that in January of 1967 \Valker Bank was informed that
the Baileys claimed an interest in the cattle. They assert
that since Walker Bank did not file its second financing
statement until February of 1967 that this knowledge of
\V alker Bank precluded the bank from obtaining a prior
lien against the cattle, even though both of the bank's
financing statements were filed with the Secretary of
State prior to the time any financing statement was filed
by the Baileys.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that none of
the "facts" alleged by respondents in Point III of their
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brief, are the facts as found by the trial court. The
"facts" asserted by respondents are not contained in the
1'-,indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and most of
them fmd no support in the record on appeal. The trial
court did not find that Walker Bank had knowledge of
the Bailey claim pror to filing its second financing statement. The trial court did not find that Walker Bank informed the Baileys that the bank did not claim an interest in the Bailey cattle. The trial court did not find that
the Baileys advised Walker Bank that the Baileys
claimed an interest in the cattle. These are the basic
"facts" upon which respondent's rely in Point III of
their brief, and none of them were found to be facts by
the trial court.
The respondents state that in January of 1967 they
recorded their contract in the Garfield County Recorders Office. They allege that because of this recording
Walker Bank had knowledge of the contents of their
financing statement and that respondents therefore have
priority under section 70A-9-401 (2) U.C.A. This contention is untenable in view of the definition of the term
"knowledge" contained in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Section 70A-l-201 (25) states in part "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it." The recording of a document with
a County Recorder does not give "actual knowledge"
but only "constructive knowledge" and then only to matters concerning real property. See In re King Furniture
City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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Even if Walker Bank had been informed of the
Hailey claim to the cattle prior to the time the bank filed
its financing statement, the bank would still have a prior
lien against the cattle since the bank was the first to file.
Where two parties claim a security interest in the same
collateral the party who first perfects his security interest by filing has the first lien against the collateral. Priority between conflicting security interests is governed
by 70A-9-312 (5) (a):
( 5) In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases of purchase
money security interests which do not qualify for
the special priorities set forth in subsections ( 3)
and ( 4) of this section) , priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral
shall be determined as follows:

(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected
by a filing, regardless of which security interest
attached first under section 70A-9-204 ( 1) and
whether it attached before or after filing;
This rule of priority applies regardless of whether
or not the party filing first knows of the claim of the
other secured party. As stated in 1. Coogan-HoganVagts, Secured Transactions Under UCC, page 177,
178:
The Code's rules as to priority between parties
claiming Code-created security interests in the
same collateral are in many instances quite rigid. 26 For chattel mortgage type transactions under the Code, notice or knowledge is immaterial
on the part of the secured party whose later security interest has priority because he is the first
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to file: a secured party who first perfects by taking delivery likewise may disregard actual know1edge.27

* * *

Suppose A gives B a security interest under
a written later agreement. A gives to C a non
possessory, and to D a possessory, secunty iuterest m the same collateral. Before B files, (I) C
files and ( 2) D takes possession under another
security agreement. Even if C and D have full
knowledge of B's interest, they take priority over
it under 9-312 ( 5) (a) and ( b) respectively; but
if E purchased the same goods he would not take
priority even though he gave value therefor it'
prior to his receiving delivery he acquired actual
or constructive notice of Bs interest. C and D
might have taken their security interest for a new
value or for an antecedent debt.
27

Every case which we have been able to uncover on
this point has held that were two parties_ are both claiming to be secured parties, under the UCC, the first party
to file has priority, regardless of whether he had knowledge that another person also claimed a security interest.
The leading case on this point, and one which is factually very similar to the case now before this Court is
Bloom v. llilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A2d 860 (1967):
The defendant Hilty purchased a quantity of pipe
from the plaintiff, and orally agreed with him that the
title was to remain in the plaintiff until the full purchase
price was paid. Later co-defendant Cardwell sold Hilty
a drilling rig. Cardwell was told by Hilty that he was not
the owner of the pipe, but nevertheless Cardwell filed a
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financing statement covering the rig and the pipe. The
plaintiff never filed.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, basing its.
reasoning on the fact that Carwell knew or had reason
to know the pipe was not Hilty's property.
The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's
decision and remanded the case. It held that although
Cardwell did have knoledge his perfected security interest prevailed over Bloom's unperfected one.
Section 9-312 ( 5) (b) gives priority to the first security interest perfected. Since the plaintiff never perfected Cardwell would prevail. Section 9-312 ( 5) does
not speak of knowledge, so Cardwell's knowledge of the
plaintiff's unperfected security interest is irrelevant.
Since Section 9-202 permits the creation of security interests regardless of the location of the title, the fact that
Bloom retained title is also irrelevant.

ucc

Willier and
Reporter-Digest makes the
following comment on the Bloom v. Hilty case at page
2-1885, 1886:

"The court is correct in its application of Article 9. The recording statute is essentially a race
statute. During the year that the plaintiff had his
unperfected security interest he could have easily
spared a few dollars and a few minutes to record
to protect himself. Since Cardwell was not only
the first one but the only one to follow the correct procedure, his security interest should prevail."
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Perhaps the most exhaustive <liscussiou of this point
is contained in the case of In re Snuth, 32ti .F. Supp.
1311 (lHinn. 1971):
"On or about April H, Hiti9, one llruce A.
Smith purchased a 19ti8 Plymouth automobile
from Southtown Chrysler in JHinneapohs, l\lmnesota. At that time he executed a condit1011al
sales contract which was assigned by the seller to
the First National Bank of lHinneapohs. Neither
the seller nor assignee filed a financing statement
evidencing the security interest.
In July of 1969 Community Credit Co. lent
Mr. Smith money ..Mr. Smith at that time executed a chattel mortgage on the Plymouth automobile in favor of the lender. The lender filed a financing statement evidencing the chattel mortgage on July 14, 1969, with the Hennepin County Register of Deeds. At the time of this transaction Community Credit Co. had actual knowledge of the unperfected security interest of the
First National Bank of .Minneapolis in the automobile.

* * *

The situation presented is one involving conflicting security interests in the same collateral.
Community Credit holds a security interest perfected by filing. The Bank's interest is prior _in
time but is unperfected either by filing or possession. It is conceded by all parties that Community
Credit as holder of the perfected security interest
would prevail if it had not had actual knowledge
of the Bank's prior unperfected interest. Hence
the issue raised before the Referee in Bankruptcy
and which now faces this Court is whether actual
knowledge on the part of Community Credit of
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the Bank's prior interest prevents it from achieving priority which would have otherwise been obtamed by being the first to file. The Referee answered this question in the affirmative and ga\'e
priority to the Bank's lien.
The portion of the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code which governs this situation is
M.S.A. §§ 336.9-312(5) [U.C.C. § 9-312(5)}.
'In all cases not governed by other rules stated
in this section (including cases of purchase
money security interests which do not qualify
for the special priorities set forth in subsections
( 3) and ( 4) of this section) , priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) In the order of filing if both are perfected
by filing, regardless of which security interest
attached first under section 336.9-204 ( 1) and
whether it attached before or after filing;
(b) In order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing, regardless of which security
interest attached first under section 336.9-204
( 1) and, in the case of a filed security interest,
whether it attached before or after filing; and
( c) In the order of attachment under section
336.9-204 ( 1) so long as neither is perfected.'
This provision nowhere makes lack of knowledge (good faith) a requirement for. obtaining
priority. The statute on its face provides for a
race to the filing office with actual knowledge of
a prior unperfected security
being irrelevant if one perfects first by filmg.
Such an approach by the Uniform Commercial
Code would clearly be a change in the pre-existing law.

• • •
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It is desirable that perfection of interests take
place promptly. It is appropriate then to provide
that a
party who fails to file runs the risk
of subordination to a later but more diligent party. In this regard it should be pointed out that
filing is of particular importance with respect to
notice to other parties. It is agreed that where the
later party has actual notice there is no need to
rely upon a filing to notify him of a prior interest.
The problem, however, cannot be analyzed in this
narrow context. Some parties may rely on the
record in extending credit and obtaining a security agreement in collateral. Although they will
prevail over the unperfected prior interest in time
if a dispute arises, it is entirely possible that they
wanted to avoid the dispute altogether. In other
wordsL they may not have relied on ultimately
prevailing in the event of a dispute but they may
have relied on the complete absence of a prior interest perfected or otherwise out of which a dispute could arise. The only way this kind of record expectation can be protected is by prompt
perfection of all security interests.

Professor Gilmore also recognizes the fact that
a good faith requirement creates evidentiary
problems.
'(T]he presence or absence of "knowledge" is
a subjective question of fact, difficult to prove.
Unless there is an overwhelming policy argument in favor of using such a criterion, it is always wise to discard it and to make decision
turn on some easily determinable objective
event-as, for example, the date of filing.' Gilmore, p. 502.
The only way to effectively produce the above re-
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suit is to make 'knowledge' irrelevant and rely
soley on perfection to establish pnority.
Finally, Professor Gilmore admits that Example 2 m the official comment to Section 9-312
( 5) seems to indicate that the apparent result was
intended. It reads as follows insofar as relevant:
'Example 2. A and H make non-purchase
money advances against the same collateral.
The collateral is in the debtor's possession and
neither interest is perfected when the second
advance is made. Whichever secured party
first
his interest (by taking possession
of the collateral or by filing) takes priority and
it makes no difference whether or not he knows
of the other interest at the time he perfects his
own.
Subsections ( 5) (a) and ( 5) ( b) both lead to
this result. It may be regarded as an adoption,
in this type of situation, of the idea, deeply
rooted at common law, of a race of diligence
among creditors. . . .'
Finally, all the cases which have dealt with the
problem indicate by holding or dicta that knowledge is irrelevant to the operation of Section 9312 {5). Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d
860 ( 1967) ; First National Bank and Trust

Company of Vinita, Okla. v. Atlas Credit Corp.,
417 F.2d 1081, at 1082, fn. l, 1083 (10th Cir.
1969); In re Gunderson, 4 U.C.C.Rep. 358, 35859 (D.C.111. 1967) .''

To the same effect see Madison National Bank v.
Newrath, 275 A.2d 495 (Md. 1971) and First National

Trust Company of Vinita v. Atlas Credit Corp.,
417 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1969).
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The respondents cite United States v. Thompson,
272 F.Supp. 77 4 ( D.C. Ark.) in s.upport of their contention that where a person has knowledge of an unperfected security interest that lrnowledge prevents him
from obtaining a first lien even though he was the first
to file. That was the decision of the lower court in the
United States v. Thompson case. However, on appeal,
this reasoning was rejected by the Circuit Court although the judgment of the lower court was affirmed on
other grounds. The Circuit Court stated: "Generally,
notice of a pre-existing unperfected lien is immaterial
under the Code." Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d
1075 (8th Cir. 1969) at p. 1083, fn. 13.
The respondents cite only one other case in support
of their position, Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d
467 (Alaska 1969) . That case did not involve a controversy between two secured parties as does the instant
case. It involved instead a controversy between a secured
party and a lien creditor. A secured party is defined by
70A-9-105 (h), Utah Code Annotated, as a lender, seller
or other person in whose faor there is a security interest.
A lien creditor is defined by 70A-9-301 ( 3), Utah Code
Annotated, as a creditor who has acquired a lien by attachment levy or the like.
The rights of a lien creditor as against a secured
creditor are governed by 70A-9-301, Utah Code Annotated. That section provides, in effect, that in order for
a lien creditor to have priority over an unperfected security interest, the lien creditor must not know of the
unperfected security interest.
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The rights of two secured parties in collateral are
governed by an entirely different section of the Code,
70A-9-312, Utah Code Annotated. That section provides, in effect, that as between two secured parties, the
party to file first has priority regardless of the fact that
he has knowledge of the other secured party's claim.
This distinction between the position of a lien creditor and a secured party was pointed out in the case of
Madison National Bank v. N ewrath, supra. The Court
stated in that case that where a person was a "secured
party" as distinguished from a "lien creditor", and he
was the first to file, he would have priority regardless of
whether he had knowledge of another's claim to the collateral. It is thus apparent that the Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc. case cited by repsondents has no application
whatsoever to the case now before this court.
The cases appear to be unanimous in holding that
the sole test in determining the priority of competing security interests in the same collateral is, "Who was the
first to file?" Whether the party filing first had knowledge that someone else claimed an unperfected security
interest is immaterial. But even if this court should hold
that knowledge of another's unperfected interest does
affect priority, it would be the Baileys and not Walker
Bank that would lose their priority in this case.
As heretofore pointed out, the trial court did not
find that Walker Bank knew of the Bailey's claim prior
to the time Walker Bank filed the financing statements.
What the trial court did find was that the Baileys knew
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of Walker Hank's claim prior to the time the Baileys
filed their financing statement. Finding of Fact No. 14
states that the Baileys learned in January, 1967, that
Walker Bank had a mortgage against the cattle ( R. 34).
It was not until four months later, on May 26, 1967, that
the Baileys filed their financing statement with the Secretary of State. See Finding of Fact No. 10 ( R. 33). At
the time they filed the Baileys knew that 'Valker Bank
had a mortgage against the cattle.

CONCLUSION
The facts in this case are indistinguishable from the
facts in the Wilson v. Burrows case. Here, as in the Wilson v. Burrows case, Walker Bank checked with the
office of the Secretary of State and was informed that
there were no financing statements on file concerning
the cattle which were to be security for Walker Hank's
loan. Here, as in the Wilson v. Burrows case, the Baileys
delivered possession ofthe cattle in question to Burrows
and then certified, in writing, that they had delivered the
cattle to him. Here, as in the Wilson v. Burrows case,
the written certification was delivered to 'Valker Bank,
whereupon Walker Bank disbursed approximately onethird of the loan proceeds. Walker Bank filed two financing statements with the Utah Secretary of State
covering the cattle in'/uestion. These financing state-
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ments were the identical statements which this court
held, in the case of Wilson v. Burrows, gave Walker
Bank a first lien against the cattle in question. Here, as
in the Wilson v. Burrow8 case, both of Walker Bank's
financing statements were filed with the Secretary of
State months before any such filing was made by the
Baileys.
The only factual distinction between this case and
the case of Wilson v. Burrows, is that here the trial court
found that the Baileys knew that Walker Bank claimed
a lien on the cattle prior to the time the Baileys filed their
financing statement. There was no such finding of prior
knowledge on the part of the Wilsons in the Wi/,son v.
Burrows case.
When the Baileys repossessed the ranch from Burrows they ended up with $20,000 of the money which
Walker Bank had loaned to Burrows on the security of
the cattle, plus $34,87 4 from sales of the calf crops from
said cattle, plus the land and equipment which were the
subject of the sales contract, plus all of the cattle which
had been sold by the Baileys to Burrows and on which
Walker Bank had a first lien. Walker Bank makes no
claim to the land or equipment which was repossessed by
the Baileys, or to the $20,000 of Walker Bank's money
which was paid to the Baileys on the sales contract.
Walker Bank does claim that the case of Wilson v. Burrows requires reversal of the judgment of the trial court
and that the case be remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Walker Bank and against the
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Baileys for the money received by the Baileys from the
sales of the calf crops and for the value of the cattle repossessed by the Baileys.
Respectfully submitted,
Roger J. McDonough and
J. Wendell Bayles of
JONES, WALDO,
HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Walker Bank &
Trust Company
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